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POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY AND THE
STUDY OF U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISION




How do justices of the U.S. Supreme Court reach decisions?
To answer this question, social scientists have invoked an increas-
ingly sophisticated set of statistical tools. While in yesteryears sim-
ple counts of, say, the number of dissents cast by justices would
have sufficed,' in today's academic marketplace analytic models
that permit the consideration of more than one factor at a time are
omnipresent.
2
That the statistical tool chest of social scientists has expanded
substantially over the last half century or so is not all that surpris-
ing. After all, scholars working in so many of the social sciences -
from psychology to sociology to political science - have become
adept methodologists. Almost all graduate programs require their
students to take at least one course in statistics - as well they
should. It would be nearly impossible to read the various discipli-
nary journals without a working knowledge of, at the very least,
multiple regression analysis.'
* We could not have written this article without access to the Papers of Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr. We are thus grateful to justice Brennan for allowing us to use
his collection and to Mary Wolfskill and David Wigdor of the Library of Congress for
easing considerably the data compilation process. We also thank the National
Science Foundation (SBR-9320284) and the Center for Business, Law, and Economics
at Washington University for the support of this work. Finally, we appreciate the
helpful comments provided by Charles Cameron, Jack Knight, and Jeffrey A. Segal.
t Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Washington University in
St. Louis.
+: Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Emory University.
I See, e.g., C. HERMAN PRrrcH=ir, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES 1937-1947 (1948).
2 J.A. SEGALI. & H.J. SPAmH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrrruNAL MODEL 72
(1993).
3 In its simplest form, regression analysis assumes that the relationship between a
dependent variable (say the number of cases decided by the Supreme Court over the
past 50 years) and an independent variable (say the number of lawyers in the United
States) is linear. Multivariate regression models allow researchers to consider more
than one independent variable (e.g., perhaps the number of lawyers and the number
of laws passed by Congress) when they seek to explain a phenomenon (e.g., the
155
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
And, yet, while those of us who study courts - like most other
social scientists - occasionally invoke the tools of statisticians to
conduct our research, we have often looked toward lawyers for our
theoretical grounding. When law schools were advocating positiv-
ist (or analytical) jurisprudence, our writings followed suit.4 When
the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s rejected positivism for soci-
ological jurisprudence, many social scientists too abandoned ana-
lytical approaches and began to develop more "realistic" models of
judicial decision making.
Now that a new movement - called positive political theory
(PPT) - has emerged from the halls of the nation's law schools, a
natural question emerges: Will social scientists adapt its theoretical
premises to their work? We argue that the answer is yes, for PPT
provides a good deal of leverage to answer perennial and central
questions concerning U.S. Supreme Court decision making.
We develop this argument in four steps. In the first step we
provide a brief overview of the relationship between political sci-
ence theories ofjudicial decision making and those that have been
offered by law professors. Our goal here is to explain how and why
social scientists adapted sociological jurisprudence to their re-
search. In the second step, we turn to the PPT movement. We
explore the central assumptions on which PPT accounts of courts
rest and argue that PPT will make some inroads into the social sci-
ence literature if it can help analysts to unravel the complexities of
decision making - just as legal realism did. The third step dem-
onstrates that PPT can, in fact, meet this goal. We accomplish this
by exploring the development of constitutional standards for the
adjudication of sex discrimination claims. Finally, we summarize
our results and underscore the contribution PPT can make to the
study of judicial decision making.
I. I. WYERS AND SOCIL ScEENrsTs: DEVELOPING MODELS OF
DECISION MAKING
One of the central themes of this article is that social scientists
have a long history of adapting theories articulated by law school
professors to their work. In this section, we briefly consider two
major examples of this phenomenon: positivist jurisprudence (the
legal model) and sociological jurisprudence (the attitudinal
growth in the Court's caseload). For an introduction to regression analyses, see M.
LEWIS-BECK, APPLIED REGRESSION - AN INTRODUCTION (1980).




model). We place emphasis on why this "borrowing" occurred so
that we may be able to understand whether or not positive political
theory will have an equally important impact on the direction of
future social science research.
A. Positivist Jurisprudence (The Legal Model)
Whether termed positivist jurisprudence (as lawyers often refer
to it6 ) or the legal model (as it is commonly called by political scien-
tists7), this school of thought centers on a rather simple assump-
tion about judicial decision making- legal doctrine, generated by
past cases, is the primary determinant of case outcomes. This
model views judges as constrained decision makers who will base
their decisions on precedent and "will adhere to the doctrine of
stare decisis. . . ."I Some scholars label this mechanical jurisprudence
because the process by which judges reach decisions is highly struc-
tured. As Rogat described it, "It]he judge's techniques were so-
cially neutral, his private views irrelevant: judging was more like
finding than making, a matter of necessity rather than choice."9
Levi was more specific about this basic pattern of legal reasoning
- reasoning by example - for which this approach calls: the
judge (1) observes a similarity between cases, (2) announces the
rule of law inherent in the first case, and (3) applies that rule to
the second case. 10
Legal education and scholarship adopted "reasoning by exam-
ple" - the process by which judges and lawyers should proceed.
Eschewing normative approaches, political scientists (at least
through the 1950s) instead viewed "reasoning by example" as the
way judges do proceed. Cushman," Corwin, 12 and many others
centered their work on the notion that previously announced legal
doctrine provides the single best predictor of Court decisions.
How positivism became so entrenched in the social science
5 The material in this section and part I.B. Sociological Jurisprudence, infra,
comes from George & Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM.
POL. Sci. REv. 323, 324 (1992).
6 SeeJOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF PosrrrvE
LAw (1904).
7 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 65.
8 STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 264-65
(1988).
9 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 65.
10 EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4-5 (1949).
11 Cushman, supra note 4, at 78.
12 Edward S. Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1922-23, 18 AM. POL. SI. REv. 49
(1924).
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literature is not difficult to discern. Many scholars reasoned that
judges (all schooled in the approach) would naturally gravitate to
it upon their ascension to the bench. After all, how else would
judges approach decision making? So too, the case studies of the
day reinforced the positivist approach's value. Articles published
in political science journals summarized the reasoning used and
the precedents set by the justices, disregarding any other factors
contributing to outcomes. Cushman's examination of the 1936-37
term (one of the most volatile in Supreme Court history) provides
an example. After acknowledging that the "1936 term . . . will
probably be rated as notable," he enumerated some of the facts
"one should bear in mind"'" - Roosevelt had won a landslide re-
election and had submitted his Court-packing plan. Rather than
demonstrate how those "facts" might have affected Court decisions,
however, Cushman simply noted that "no suggestion is made as to
what inferences, if any, might be drawn from them." 4 He then
proceeded to analyze the New Deal cases via existing precedent -
a difficult task indeed.
In other words, although Cushman published his work in a
premiere political science journal (the American Political Science Re-
view), it could have appeared in any law review of the day. For both
the theory he adopted - positivist jurisprudence - and his ana-
lytic approach - the examination of precedent - had originated
in the nation's law schools.
B. Sociological Jurisprudence (The Attitudinal Model)
While the legal model was predominating political science
thinking about the Court, new perspectives emerged from the
ranks of the nation's judiciary and from its law schools. In general,
these thinkers denounced legalism as mechanical jurisprudence, 5
and they beckoned judges to consider more dynamic factors as ba-
ses for decisions. Many credit Holmes's The Common Law'6 with
initiating this plea. Students of this school often cite as exemplary
his remark that "[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has
been experience .... [I] t cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics." 7 Illus-
'3 Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Law in 1936-37, 32 AM. POL. SCi. REv. 278,
278 (1938).
14 Id.
15 See Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARv. L REv. 697
(1931).
16 OuvER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw (1881).
17 Id. at 1-2.
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trative, too, is Louis Brandeis's famous brief in Muller v. Oregon,18
containing 113 pages of sociological data but only two of legal ar-
gument. It was Pound, 9 however, who catalyzed the first strain of
extrajudicialism, sometimes called sociological jurisprudence. In
his seminal Harvard Law Review article, Pound drew his now-famous
distinction between "law in books" and "law in action," behooving
judges to adopt the latter, without necessarily abandoning the for-
mer. Cardozo and many others followed suit.
Later adapters of sociological jurisprudence - the realists of
the 1930s - though were far more radical in orientation, main-
taining that rules based on precedents were nothing more than
smokescreens 20 or "myths, clung to by man out of a childish need
for sureness and security. A mature jurisprudence recognizes that
there is no certainty in law. ...
So began a long line of thinkers who harshly critiqued legal
reasoning for its inadequacy as a basis for judicial decision making,
an inadequacy stemming from various considerations. From a nor-
mative standpoint, many followed Brandeis's lead, arguing that ex-
tra-legal factors should enter judicial deliberations. After all, if
judges were constrained by precedent, law would remain static
when it should reflect changing morals and values. Additionally,
critics asserted that values and attitudes developed during child-
hood certainly influence justices, just as they do all other people.
22
It would be extraordinary, they claimed, to think that judges, just
because they don black robes, were any less susceptible to such in-
fluences. Indeed, justices may be even more vulnerable than other
decision makers because the rules of law are "typically available to
support either side."2 1 In making choices between competing
precedents, then, other factors are bound to come into play.
Although legal realism gained a strong following within the
nation's leading law schools during the 1930s, political scientists
were reluctant adherents. It was not until the publication of Pritch-
ett's The Roosevelt Court 24 in 1948 that students began to abandon a
positivist approach and view Court decisions more critically and an-
18 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
19 Pound, supra note 15, at 697.
20 See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); JEROME N. FRANK,
COURTS ON TRIAL: MYrH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUS-ICE (1950); KARL N. LLEWEL,
LYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1951).
21 HARRY P. STUMPF, AMERICAN JUDICIAL POLrICS 16 (1988).
22 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 20.
23 C. Herman Pritchett, The Development ofJudicial Research, in FRONTIERS OF JUDI-
CIAL RESEARCH 31 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969).
24 PRITCHETT, supra note 1.
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alytically. In essence, Pritchett brought legal realism to political
science. More specifically, Pritchett observed that dissents accom-
pany many decisions. 5 If precedent drove Court rulings, Pritchett
asked, then why did various justices in interpreting the same legal
provisions consistently reach different conclusions on the impor-
tant questions of the day? He concluded that the law was unable to
explain why the justices voted the way they did; rather, he argued
that justices were "motivated by their own preferences," just as
Frank and the other legal realists maintained.26
Pritchett's work, however, did more than simply adapt legal
realism to political science. It also equipped scholars with the tools
necessary to estimate and evaluate its propositions. For it was
Pritchett who first systematically examined dissents and voting
blocs on the Court; he was also the first to invoke left-right voting
continuums to study ideological behavior. That Pritchett was able
to place justices of the Roosevelt Court on continuums, such as the
one depicted in Figure 1, helped him to substantiate his conclu-
sion that political attitudes have a strong influence on judicial
decisions.
FIGURE 1. P rrcErr's L-rT-Ricarr CONTNUUM OF JUSTICES
SERVING BETWEEN 1939 AND 1941*
II
LeftRih
* C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion AmongJustices of the U.S. Supreme Court
1939-1941, 35 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 894 (1941).
Note. Reed appears twice because his dissents were "equally divided" between the lib-
eral and conservative wings of the Court.
Finally, Pritchett's work provided the fodder for development
of the contemporary version of legal realism in the form of the
attitudinal model - a development more fully stylized and real-
ized by Schubert," Spaeth,"s and Ulmer,2 who incorporated the
25 PrCHETT, supra note 1.
26 ParrcHmTT-, supra note 1, at xiii.
27 See GLENDON SCHUBERT, QUANTrTATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959);




assumptions of legal realism into their models of decision making.
Like Frank, they viewed the Court's environment as one that pro-
vided the justices with "great freedom to base their decisions solely
upon the personal policy preferences."' But, unlike the realists,
Schubert and the others proceeded to define and to test systemati-
cally attitudinal models of judicial behavior.
The refinement of the attitudinal model since the 1960s is a
story that has been well-told elsewhere."1 It is enough to note here
that this model - which follows legal realism to the extent that it
views justices as "single-minded seekers of legal policy," 2 whose
votes depend solely on the facts of cases vis-4-vis their attitudes and
values - predominates the empirical political science literature.
Why? Two answers come to mind. First, beginning with Schu-
bert"5 and culminating with Segal and Spaeth,' attitudinalists have
claimed to gather a tremendous amount of systematic support for
their theory that unconstrained attitudes largely determine votes.
To test this view, contemporary political scientists usually begin
with a measure of political preferences - a measure that is in-
dependent of the vote. In Table 1, we depict such a measure. It
was formulated by analyzing the comments of editorial writers on
Supreme Court nominees, and it ranges from -1 (extremely con-
servative) to 1 (extremely liberal). 5 Attitudinalists then correlate
this measure with aggregated voting behavior (see Table 1) to de-
termine the degree to which they are related. Their results are
quite robust; for example, one can predict nearly 70% of the civil
liberties votes based solely on the policy preferences (as measured
by the editorial scores) of the justices. It is just this sort of predic-
tion accuracy that political scientists find especially attractive. 6
But there is a second reason for the attitudinal model's domina-
tion. Just as scholars were claiming that the key premise of the attitu-
dinal model held up against systematic, data-intensive investigations,
28 See Harold J. Spaeth, An Approach to the Study of Attitudinal Differences as an Aspect
ofJudicial Behavior, 6 MIDwESTJ. POL. Sci. 54 (1961).
29 See S. Sidney Ulmer, The Analysis of Behavior Patterns in the Supreme Court of the
United States, 22J. POL. 629 (1960).
30 DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 22
(1976).
31 See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 73.
32 George & Epstein, supra note 5, at 325.
33 See SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND, supra note 27.
34 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 73.
35 For more details on this measure, see Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and
the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 813 (1995).
36 See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2.
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TABLE I. JUSTICES' VALuEs AND VoTs*




































































































































Note: Ideological Value is derived from content analyses of newspaper editorials. It
ranges from -1.00 (extremely conservative) to 1.00 (extremely liberal). Civil
Liberties Vote and Economics Vote represent percent liberal votes in those issue
areas during the 1946-1992 terms.
* Segal et al., supra note 35, at 816.
aValues and votes as a Nixon appointee
bValues and votes as a Reagan appointee
they were also arguing that other perspectives - especially ap-
proaches grounded in positivist jurisprudence - could not withstand
similar scrutiny. In one particularly interesting study, Segal and
Spaeth examined whether justices follow previously established legal
162 [Vol. 1:155
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rules even when they disagree with them. They found that the vast
majority of justices who dissented from precedents set in landmark
cases were not influenced by those precedents in subsequent
decisions."7
In short, it is easy to see why legal realism, in the form of the
attitudinal model, has come to dominate the way many social scientists
- particularly political scientists - think aboutjudicial decision mak-
ing. Its ability to account for votes is quite high and it seems to pro-
vide a more robust explanation for judicial behavior than other
existing approaches, particularly positivism.
II. PosrIv PourIcAL THEoRY
Despite the attitudinal model's domination, it is not without
its problems. Two points of critique are particularly relevant here.
The first deficiency is that the attitudinal model does not admit
strategic behavior on the part of the justices in their voting on the
merits of cases. That is, it assumes that justices reach decisions
without regard to the preferences of other relevant actors (their
colleagues, the public, Congress, and so forth) and the actions they
expect them to take. In this model, justices are naive actors, who
simply and always vote their sincere preferences into law. To put it
another way, attitudinalists believe that "Rehnquist votes the way he
does because he is extremely conservative; Marshall voted the way
he did because he is extremely liberal."
Yet, there is substantial evidence that this is not always the
case, that, in fact, an interdependent (or strategic) component ex-
ists in Supreme Court decision making. Eskridge, for example, has
shown that justices driven by policy goals do not vote their sincere
preferences when they are interpreting civil rights laws if they be-
lieve that Congress desires to and has the wherewithal to overturn
their decisions.!" By the same token, Murphy' and Howard 4 have
demonstrated that justices are open to persuasion from their col-
leagues; in fact,justices often change their votes sometime between
conference (when the initial vote is taken) and opinion
37 Jeffrey A. Segal & HaroldJ. Spaeth, The Influence of Stare Deasis on the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, AM. J. POL. Sc. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript at 14-16, on
file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
38 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 65.
39 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/Presi-
dent Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991).
40 See WALTER F. MuRPHY, ELEMENTs OF JuDIcIAL STRATEGY (1964).
41 J. Woodford HowardJr., On the Fluidity ofJudicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 43
(1968).
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publication.42
The second and related deficiency of the attitudinal approach
is that it gives us little leverage on understanding Court policies
and the process that generates them because it focuses exclusively
on votes. To see this, consider the simple example depicted in Fig-
ure 2. There, we use the editorial scores (see Table 1) to align the
justices on a left-right scale. Now suppose we wanted to use these
scores to tell us about the law generated by an abortion case, say,
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,4" in which
the Court, among other things, struck down a spousal notification
provision by a 5-4 vote. Using the continuum depicted in Figure 2,
the attitudinal model would predict that Scalia, Rehnquist,
Thomas, and Blackmun dissented. But that prediction would be
wrong: Blackmun voted to strike the spousal consent requirement;
it was White who voted with the dissenters to uphold it. Yet, even if
the prediction were correct, how much would the attitudinal
model tell us about the policy resulting from the Court's decision?
Would it give us any information about the standard the plurality
adopted to adjudicate future abortion cases? The answer is no: it
would simply attempt to predict the votes in the case.
FIGURE 2. ORDINAL RANKINGS OF JusTicEs BASED ON
EDITORIAL ScoRES*
White O'Connor Kennedy Souter Stevens Thomas Blackun Re!_uist Scalia
Left Rigt
* Constructed by the authors with scores derived from Ideological Values in Segal et
al., supra note 35, at 816.
It is these shortcomings of the attitudinal model that may at-
tract social scientists to positive political theory (PPT). For (1) the
assumption of strategic interaction is central to many of these PPT
models and (2) the goal of PPT, in an important sense, is to under-
stand the law, not just votes. Let us elaborate.
A. Positive Political Theory: An Overview
The application of positive political theory to judicial deci-
sions is a relatively recent phenomenon. Although some scholars
42 Saul Brenner, FNuidity on the United States Supreme Court: A Reexamination, 24 AM.J.
POL. Sci. 526, 530 (1980) (shows that at least one Justice changed his vote in sixty-one
percent of cases decided during the 1946, 1947, 1949, 1950, 1954, and 1955 terms of
the Supreme Court).
43 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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invoked the intuitions of this approach as early as 1958,4 contem-
porary usage has its genesis in a 1989 dissertation by Brian Marks, a
student of economics at Washington University.' In that work,
Marks set out to understand why Congress did not overturn the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v. BelL"
Since Marks's work, numerous analysts (who generally refer to
themselves as positive political theorists) have set out to build on it.
The list of PPTheorists is long, with some of its most important
practitioners4" coming from the ranks of the nation's law schools.
And their numbers are growing, as is their influence.
But what does PPT entail? As with most emerging research
programs, there is some dispute among practitioners over the pre-
cise meaning of the enterprise. Still, most seem to agree that "PPT
consists of non-normative, rational-choice theories of political insti-
tutions." ' So, at the very least, PPTheorists promote a particular
kind of rational choice account ofjudicial decisions - an account
we shall call strategic rationality. We can state that account in the
following terms: U.S. Supreme Court justices are strategic single-
minded seekers of legal policy, who realize that their ability to
achieve policy goals depends on the preferences of others, on the
choices the justices expect others to make, and on the institutional
44 See Schubert, The Study ofJudicial Decision-Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior,
52 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 1007 (1958).
45 Marks, A Model ofJudicial Influence on Congressional Policymaking: Grove City Col-
lege v. Bell, Ph.D. diss., Washington University (1989) (on file with the authors).
46 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
47 Some of the more prominent scholars include: William Eskridge of the Ge-
orgetown University Law Center (see, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 39; W.N. Eskridge Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 417 (1991);
W.N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DvNAwc STATUTORY INTERPRETA-ION (1994)); Daniel Farber of
the University of Minnesota School of Law (see, e.g., D.A. FARBER & P.P. FRucKE,, LAw
AND PUBUC CHOICE (1991)); Daniel Rodriguez of the Boalt Hall School of Law (at the
University of California at Berkeley) (see, e.g., Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political
Dimensions of Regulatoy Reform, 72 WASH. U. LAw Q. 1 (1994)); and Matthew Spitzer of
the University of Southern California Law Center (see, e.g., Linda R. Cohen & Mat-
thew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65 (1994)).
Should anyone doubt the growing influence of this group, note the foreword to
the Harvard Law Review's examination of the Supreme Court's 1993 term. It was co-
authored by Eskridge, one of the leaders of the PPT movement. Also consider that
important law reviews and journals have dedicated volumes to PPT (e.g., GEo. LJ. and
LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.). Finally, several influential university presses, including
Harvard (D.G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw (1994)) and Chicago (DA.
FARBER & P.P. FRicxEY, LAW AND PUBLC CHOICE (1991)) have put their imprint on this
work.
48 See Farber & Frickey, Foreword: Positive Political Theory in the Nineties, 80 GEo. L.J.
457, 467 (1992) (contains the results of a survey of Positive Political Theorists).
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This account contains three important ideas: (1) justices' ac-
tions are directed toward the attainment of goals (primarily they
are "single-minded seekers of policy"5"); (2) justices are strategic
(they "realize that their ability to achieve their goals depends on
the preferences of others" and "on the choices they expect others
to make"); and (3) institutions ("the institutional context") struc-
ture justices' interactions.5 1 Each of these components deserves
some attention.
B. Justices as Single-Minded Seekers of Legal Policy
A key assumption of strategic rationality is that actors make
decisions consistent with their goals and interests. Indeed, we say
that a "rational" decision occurs when an actor takes a course of
action (makes a decision) that satisfies her desires most efficiently.
This means that when a political actor selects, say, between two al-
ternative courses of action, she will choose the one that she thinks
is most likely to help her attain her goals; all we need to assume is
that she acts "intentionally and optimally" toward some specific
objective. 2
Rational choice accounts further suggest that an actor can or-
der her desires on a scale - called "utility" - based on the
"pleasures" she will obtain by satisfying them. Once the actor or-
ders her desires, she can compare the relative degree of satisfac-
tion (utility) generated by each decision and, in turn, act so as to
maximize her utility.55 To put this in terms of a concrete example,
consider Figure 3 below. Here, we show the choices confronting a
justice over which standard of review to apply in abortion cases.
Now suppose Justice X sincerely prefers "compelling interest" to
"undue burden" to "rational basis." If that were the case, then we
would say that X assigns a higher utility to "compelling" than to
49 LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (forthcoming 1997)
(on file with the authors).
50 Typically, rational choice theorists assume that justices are "single-minded seek-
ers of policy," George & Epstein, supra note 5, at 325, but that need not be the case.
As we discuss below, it is up to the researcher to specify the content of actors' goals.
51 We adopt Knight's working definition of a social institution. First, "an institu-
tion is a set of rules that structure social interactions in particular ways." Second, "for
a set of rules to be an institution, knowledge of these rules must be shared by mem-
bers of the relevant community." SeeJ. KNIGHT, INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIAL COr'irucr 2-
3 (1992).
52 Id. at 17.




"undue burden" than to "rational basis" and that Xwill take actions
(that is, make choices) to maximize the chances of obtaining
"compelling."
FIGuRE 3. CHOICES OF LEGAL STANDARD IN ABORTION CASES*
Compellin Inteest UlndueBurde Rational Basis
SI I
Less Restrictive More Restrictive
* Constructed by the authors.
To give meaning to the assumption that people are "utility
maximizers," however, analysts must specify the content of actors'
goals.' And that is where the notion of justices as "single minded
seekers of legal policy"55 comes in. On many PPT accounts, the
primary goal of all justices is to see the law reflect their preferred
policy positions, and that they will take actions to advance this
objective.
In so arguing, though, most PPTheorists recognize that policy
is not the only goal justices pursue. In some of this work, in fact,
scholars explore another important goal: to establish and retain
the legitimacy of the Court.m For, as PPT advocates realize, the
Court must possess some level of respect before it can make au-
thoritative policy - policy that other institutions, the public, and
states will view as binding on them.
Still, readers should not lose sight of the general point: legiti-
macy, like most other goals scholars ascribe to justices, is a means
to an end - and that end is policy.57 This is not a particularly
controversial claim. Justices may have goals other than policy, but
no serious scholar of the Court would claim that policy is not
prime among them. Indeed, this is perhaps one of the few things
54 If they do not, then resulting explanations take on a tautological quality, "since
we can always assert that person's goal is to do precisely what we observe him or her to
be doing." PEaR C. ORDESHOOK, A PotarrcAL. TH~om" PRIMER 10-11 (1992).
55 George & Epstein, supra note 5, at 325.
56 Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, On the Stggle for Judicial Supremacy, LAW & Soc'Y
Rlv. (forthcoming 1996) (manuscript on file with the authors and the New York City
Law Re iew).
57 For example, in a particularly thoughtful essay, Baum suggests that some mem-
bers of the Court desire to interpret the law in a principled, consistent, and accurate
fashion. He calls this a "legal" goal, as it typically entails adhering to precedent. See
Lawrence Baum, Wat Judges Want: Judges' Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL. RE-
SEARCH Q. 749 (1994). As Segal and Spaeth (1996) demonstrate, however, most jus-
tices take this route only when the existing precedent favors their particular policy
position. In other words, precedent is a means to a policy end. See SEGAL & SPAETm,
supra note 37 (manuscript at 1-7, on file with the authors and the New York City Law
Rewiew).
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over which almost all students of the judicial process - legal real-
ists and positive political theorists alike - agree.
C. Strategic Justices
The second part of the PPT account ties back to the first: for
justices to maximize their utility, they must act strategically in mak-
ing their choices. By "strategic," as we suggested above, PPThe-
orists mean that judicial decision making is interdependent. It is
not enough to say, as the attitudinal model does, that Justice X
chose action 1 over 2 because she preferred 1 to 2. Rather, inter-
dependency suggests the following proposition: Justice X chose 1
because X believed that the other relevant actors - perhaps Jus-
tice Y or Senator Z- would choose 2, 3, etc., and given these
choices, action 1 led to a better outcome for Justice X than did the
other alternative actions.58 To put it more plainly, a justice acts
strategically when she realizes that her fate depends on the prefer-
ences of the other actors and the actions she expects them to take
(not just on her own preferences and actions)."
Occasionally, strategic calculations lead justices to vote their
sincere preferences or sign opinions that reflect them. Suppose, in
our example, all of the other justices agreed that "compelling in-
terest" was the appropriate standard to use in abortion cases and
that they knew that they all agreed. If this were the case, then our
Justice X (who, recall, sincerely prefers the compelling interest
test) may feel free to write an opinion that reflects her sincere pref-
erences, for they are the same as everyone else's.
In other instances, strategic calculations lead justices to act in
a sophisticated fashion (that is, in a way that does not reflect their
sincere or true preferences) so that they can avoid seeing their
most preferred policy rejected by, say, their colleagues in favor of
their least preferred one.60 To see why, reconsider Figure 3.
Again, suppose that Justice X was to select among three possible
standards in an abortion case; further suppose thatJustice Xwas, in
fact, a single-minded seeker of legal policy. While the attitudinal
Justice Xwould vote her unconstrained preference of "compelling
interest," the strategic Justice X might choose undue burden if -
depending on, say, the preferences of the other justices - that
58 See ORDESHOOK, supra note 54, at 7-56.
59 Charles Cameron, Decision-Making and Positive Political Theory (Or Using Game The-
oiy to Study Judicial Politics) 2-3 (Nov. 11-12, 1994) (position paper prepared for the
1994 Columbus Conference, Columbus, OH) (on file with the authors).
60 See MuRPHY, supra note 40; Rodriguez, supra note 47.
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would allow her to avoid "rational basis," her least preferred posi-
tion. In so doing, Justice Xwould be choosing the course of action
that any rational actor, concerned with maximizing policy prefer-
ences, would take. That is, for Justice X to set policy as close as
possible to her ideal point - which, recall, is the goal most PPThe-
orists ascribe to all justices - strategic behavior is essential. In this
instance, she would need to act in a sophisticated fashion, given
her beliefs about the preferences of the other justices and the
choices she expected them to make.
But, as the work of PPTheorists makes abundantly clear, strate-
gic considerations do not simply involve calculations over what col-
leagues will do. Justices must also consider the preferences of
other key political actors, including Congress, the President, and
even the public. The logic here is as follows.6 As all students of
American politics know, two key concepts undergird our constitu-
tional system. The first concept is the separation of powers doc-
trine, under which each of the branches of government has distinct
functions: the legislature makes the laws, the executive imple-
ments those laws, and the judiciary interprets them. The second
concept is the notion of checks and balances: each branch of gov-
ernment imposes limits on the primary function of the others. For
example, as Figure 4 shows, the judiciary may interpret laws and
even strike them down as being in violation of the Constitution.
Congressional committees, however, can introduce legislation to
override the Court's decision; if they do, Congress must act by
adopting the committees' recommendation, adopting a different
version of it, or rejecting it. If Congress takes action, then the Pres-
ident has the option of vetoing the law. In this depiction, the last
"move" rests again with Congress, which must decide whether to
override the President's veto.6"
61 We adopt this discussion from Lym EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: INSTrTUTONAL POWERS AND CONSTRAINTS 49-
50 (2d ed. 1995).
62 In this figure, we depict a sequence in which the Court makes the first "move"
and Congress the last. Of course, it is possible to lay out other sequences and to
include other (or different) actors (see Christopher J. Zorn, Congress and the Supreme
Court: Reevaluating the "Interest Group Perspective" (April 1995) (paper presented at the
1995 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association) (on file with the
authors). For example, we could construct a scenario in which the Court moves first;
congressional committees and Congress again go next but, this time, they propose a
constitutional amendment (rather than a law); and the states (not the President)
have the last turn by deciding whether or not to ratify the amendment.
It is also worth noting that such a reconstruction might make more sense for
cases, such as Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), that involve consti-
tutional questions. Our reasoning here is as follows: Although Congress can pass leg-
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FIGuRE 4. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS/CHECKS AND BALANCES
SYSTEM IN ACTION: AN EXAMPLE*
Cowl C-F-rs Ptesidmt oss
intmret or YES Co nl YES acm YES vetoes YES overrides
overturns law - Seek to - - --- 4 veto
Ovenide
Cours Decision
NO NO NO NO
Cours Dedgon Com'sDec Cout's Deion Court's Deds
Undistu bed Undtbed Dibbed Urdsturbed
* Adapted from: Eskridge, supra note 39, at 644 (1991).
It is just these kinds of checks that lead policy-oriented justices
to concern themselves with the positions of Congress, the Presi-
dent, and even the public. For if their objective is to see their fa-
vored policies become the ultimate law of the land, then they must
take into account the preferences of the key actors and the actions
they expect them to take. Otherwise, they run the risk of seeing,
say, Congress replace their most preferred position with their least,
or of massive non-compliance with their rulings in which case their
policy fails to take on the force of "law."63
To see these points, consider Figure 5, which we adopt from
Eskridge's work on the Court's interpretation of civil rights legisla-
tion.64 On the horizontal line - which represents the possible in-
terpretations the Court could give to, for example, a civil rights
statute ordered from most liberal to most conservative - we place
the preferences of several key political actors. We denote the
Court's and the President's most preferred positions as "J" and "P,"
respectively. "M" signifies the preferred position of the median
member of Congress and "C" of the congressional committees with
jurisdiction over civil rights bills.65 "C(M)" represents the commit-
islation to alter the course of future constitutional rulings (see e.g., the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993)), the more com-
monly-discussed route is through the proposal of a constitutional amendment. If this
is so, then we might want to reconstruct the sequence in a way that would allow the
Court to consider whether Congress has the requisite numbers (two-thirds of both
Houses) to propose an amendment and whether three-fourths of the states would
support ratification - and not whether Congress and the President would overturn
its decision through legislation.
63 They also open themselves up for other forms of retaliation on the part of Con-
gress and the President: legislation removing their jurisdiction to hear certain kinds
of cases and impeachment, to name just two. See MuRPHY, supra note 40.
64 LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERI-
CAN SOCIETY PLAYING THE RECONSTRUCTION GAME, in CONTEMPLATING COURTS 321-
324 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995).
65 In denoting these preferred points ofJ, M, P, and C, we assume that the actors
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tee's indifference point "where the Court can set policy which the
committee likes no more and no less than the opposite policy that
could be chosen by the full chamber."66 To put it another way,
because C(M) and M are equidistant from C, the committee likes
C(M) as much as it likes M; it is indifferent between the two.
FIGURE 5. HYPOTHETICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PREFERENCES*
Liber I I I I Conservaive
Policy J C(M) C M p Policy
* Adapted from Eskridge, supra note 39, at 613 and Eskridge, supra note 47, at 417.
Note:J=majority of Supreme Court; C(M)=committees' indifference point; C=relevant
committees; M=median member of Congress; P=president.
As we can see, the Court is to the left of Congress, the key
committees, and the President. This means, in this illustration,
that the Court favors a more liberal policy than do the other insti-
tutions. Now suppose that the Court has a civil rights case before
it, one involving the claim of a woman who says that she has been
sexually harassed at her place of employment in violation of fed-
eral law.
How would the Court decide this case on its merits? Under
the logic of the "attitudinal" approach the justices would vote ex-
actly the position shown on the line; they would set the policy atJ.
The PPT account suggests a different response: given the distribu-
tion of the most preferred positions of the actors in Figure 5, stra-
tegic justices would not be willing to take the risk and vote their
sincere preferences. They would see that Congress could easily
override the Court's position and that the President would support
Congress. That is because the policy sincerely desired by the Court
would be to the left of the indifference point of the relevant com-
mittees, giving them every incentive to introduce legislation lying
at their preferred point of C. Congress would support such legisla-
tion because it would prefer C to J and the President would sign it
as he too likes C better than J. So, in this instance, the rational
course of action - the best choice for justices interested in policy
prefer an outcome that is nearer to that point than one that is further away. Or, to
put it more technically, "beginning at [the actor's] ideal point, utility always declines
monotonically in any direction. This feature is known as single-peakedness of prefer-
ences." See Keith Krehbiel, Spatial Models of Legislative Choice, 13 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 259,
263 (1988).
66 Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, supra note 47,
at 381.
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- is to place the policy near C(M). The reason is simple: since
the committees are indifferent between C(M) and M, they would
have no incentive to introduce legislation to overturn a policy set at
C(M). Thus, the Court would end up with a policy close to, but
not exactly on, their ideal point without risking congressional
reaction.
Of course, by acting in a sophisticated fashion, the Court's ma-
jority would neither see its most preferred position nor its least pre-
ferred position written into law. Yet, this course of action - the
rational course of action under the circumstances - may lead to
the best possible outcome for the majority.
D. Institutions
The PPT account of decision making suggests that we cannot
fully understand the courses of action justices take unless we con-
sider the institutional context under which they operate. By insti-
tutions, PPTheorists mean sets of rules that "structure social
interactions in particular ways." Under this definition, institutions
can be formal (such as laws) or informal (such as norms and con-
ventions). For laws, norms, and conventions to be institutions,
however, members of the relevant community must share knowl-
edge of them. 7
For example, it is hard to imagine a plausible story of judicial
decision making that did not consider the norm governing the cre-
ation of precedent: that a majority ofjustices must sign an opinion
for it to become the law of the land. Consider the following: sup-
pose ourJustice Xknew that four other justices shared her prefer-
ence for "compelling interest" over "undue burden" over "rational
basis" and further suppose that X was to write the opinion for the
Court. Surely, under those circumstances, she would feel freer to
adopt the compelling interest standard than she would be if only
three others were squarely in her camp. Indeed, if less than four
others were firmly behind her, she might be willing to consider
"undue burden" if that was the best she thought she could do.
This is why the rule for the establishment of precedent is so impor-
tant; if only four justices' "signatures" were required for precedent,
then our opinion writer would be in a far better position.
Another institution of some significance is the constitutional
"rule" that justices "hold their Offices during good Behaviour."6"
In other words, barring an impeachment by Congress, justices have
67 See KNIGHT, supra note 51, at 2-3.
6 U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 1.
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life tenure. In contrast to members of legislatures and even to
judges in many states, justices do not have to face the voters to
retain their positions. This lack of an electoral connection - the
institution of life tenure - speaks to the goals justices possess: in-
stead of acting to maximize their chances for reelection (as do
members of Congress69), justices act to maximize policy.70 To see
just how consequential the institution of life tenure can be, one
only has to think about the kinds of activities in which an
electorally-oriented (as opposed to a policy-oriented) justice would
engage. For example, instead of considering the preferences of
her colleagues and Congress over what test to use in an abortion
case, our Justice X would be tapping the pulse of her "constitu-
ents," talking with lobbyists, holding press conferences and other-
wise behaving in the ways we associate with members of Congress,
not justices of the Supreme Court.
These are but two examples. On the PPT account, institutions
governing the opinion assignment process,7' certiorari decisions,72
and conference discussion, 7 are equally as central to understand-
ing judicial decisions.
E. Discussion
As our discussion above suggests, PPTheorists and Legal Real-
ists agree on some fundamental aspects of judicial decision mak-
ing. First, both schools typically suggest that justices are driven by
policy in that they desire to etch their preferences into law. Sec-
ond, both agree on the importance of institutions, though they in-
terpret their effects somewhat differently. For attitudinalists, the
institution of life tenure frees justices to vote their sincere prefer-
ences. For PPTheorists, it does no such thing; in other words, if
justices behave in ways that accord with their unconstrained prefer-
ences, it is not necessarily because they lack an electoral
connection.
It is this last issue that brings us to the major points of disa-
greement between the two approaches. First, and most obvious, is
69 See D. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECToRAL CONNECTION (1974).
70 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 69-72.
71 E.g., that the ChiefJustice assigns the opinion if he is in the majority, if he is not,
the most senior associate member of the majority coalition assigns the opinion. See
SEGAL & SPAETH, Supra note 2, at 262.
72 E.g., that four justices of the nine justices must want to hear a case ("the Rule of
Four"). See SEGAL & SPAETH supra note 2, at 180.
73 E.g., that conference discussion begins with the Chief Justice and moves in or-
der of seniority. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 210-211.
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that attitudinalists take issue with the PPT characterization of jus-
tices as strategic actors. They claim that justices, unlike members
of Congress and the President, are free to vote their unconstrained
preferences largely because they have no fear of electoral defeat.
Proponents of the attitudinal school, Segal and Spaeth, put it this
way, "Members of the Supreme Court further their policy goals be-
cause they lack electoral or political accountability, ambition for
higher office, and comprise a court of last resort that controls its
own jurisdiction. Although the absence of these factors may hin-
der the personal policy-making capabilities of lower court judges,
their presence enables justices to vote as they individually see fit."74
However, PPT suggests that this argument is both misguided
and internally inconsistent. It may be misguided because justices
do not need an electoral connection to act strategically. They
know that the other institutions wield an impressive array of weap-
ons - weapons that range from overturning judicial decisions
through legislation to holding judicial salaries constant to im-
peaching justices and that can be deployed to move policy away
from their preferred positions or threaten their institutional power
in other ways. To argue that justices do not consider the prefer-
ences of other institutions is to argue thatjustices do not care very
much about what happens to policy after a case leaves their cham-
bers. This makes little sense, especially since the justices know that
Congress quite often reviews their decisions.75
It is also possible that when attitudinalists characterize justices
as "naive" actors, they are making a claim that is inconsistent with
their own theory. Consider how two attitudinalists, Rohde and
Spaeth, describe their perspective: "[T]he primary goals of
Supreme Court justices in the decision-process are policy goals.
Each member of the Court has preferences concerning the policy
questions faced by the Court, and when the justices make decisions
they want the outcomes to approximate as nearly as possible those
policy preferences."7 6 Herein lies the inconsistency: if justices are
the policy maximizers that Rohde and Spaeth make them out to
be, then at the very least they must be concerned with the positions
of their colleagues. For they know that their colleagues can make
credible threats to abandon a majority coalition, to write sepa-
rately, to switch their votes, and, generally, to move policy far from
74 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2, at 69.
75 Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court Statutoy Inte pretation Decisions, supra note 47,
at 331.
76 ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 30, at 72.
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their preferred positions. How can justices possibly achieve their
policy goals if they vote naively?
By the same token, PPTheorists suggest that it is only common
sensical to believe that collegial court decision making is'an inher-
ently strategic situation. One scholar remarks on the context of
U.S. Court of Appeals decision making in this way: "the outcomes
of cases in federal appellate courts depend on the individual votes
of several judges sitting as a panel. Plausibly, the judges care about
the outcome of cases, and they certainly recognize that outcomes
depend on collective behavior."77 The same, of course, is true of
U.S. Supreme Court justices.
A second point of disagreement between PPTheorists and atti-
tudinalists, as we have already described, concerns the emphasis of
their studies. While attitudinalists seek to explain the vote on the
merits of cases, a goal that seems to be quite narrow in scope,
PPTheorists attempt to understand "law" and the process by which
law is made.
Although this aim is admirable, PPTheorists are only begin-
ning to sustain their position. Thus, in the remainder of the arti-
cle, we consider this question: does PPT provide us with leverage
to understand the law and the process by which the Court develops
it? This is obviously a crucial question to raise, for if we answer it in
the affirmative, we suspect that social scientists may begin to adopt
its premises to their research. On the other hand, if PPT fails to
provide a useful framework to study the development of the law, it
is likely that the tenets of legal realism will continue to dominate
contemporary research.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR ADJUDICATING SEX
DISCRIMnIATION CLAIMS
To answer this question, we apply the PPT account ofjudicial
decisions to the development of constitutional standards for adju-
dicating sex discrimination claims. We describe and analyze the
events surrounding two cases which were critical to that develop-
ment: Frontiero v. Richardson7" and Craig v. Boren.9 Our specific in-
terest is in using PPT to explain the courses of action taken by
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., the opinion writer in both cases.
77 Cameron, supra note 59, at 3.
78 411 U.S. 577 (1973).
79 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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A. From Reed v. Reed to Frontiero v. Richardson
Although Frontiero is of immense significance, it is not the
starting point for most modern-day discussions of tests governing
sex discrimination claims. That distinction belongs to Reed v.
Reed 80 in which the Court struck down an Idaho law that gave
preference to men over women as estate administrators. In so do-
ing, the justices seemed to apply a rational basis standard, even
though attorneys for the appellant Sally Reed (including Ruth
Bader Ginsburg) had urged the Court to find sex a suspect class
and had only offered the traditional approach as an alternative.8 '
As Chief Justice Burger's unanimous opinion indicates: "[t]he
question presented by this case... is whether a difference in the
sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a
rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the
operation of [the law]."
82
The answer, according to the Court, was that it did not. In
particular, the justices rejected Idaho's two major justifications for
the law: that it would reduce the workload of probate courts and
that men had more education and experience in financial matters
than women. Both justifications, according to Burger, constituted
precisely the kinds of arbitrary legislative choices and overbroad
assumptions that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to
prevent.
From the time the Court handed down Reed, analysts and prac-
titioners have disagreed over whether the ruling hindered or
helped the plight of women. Hordes, for example, was critical of
Burger's application of the rational basis standard:
[T]here is a real danger that Reed will be used in the future to
deny the claims of women plaintiffs. For Reed reaffirms the
heavy burden of proof that the plaintiff must meet, and may well
demonstrate that only in the most blatant of cases will relief be
granted. The Court specifically refused - although urged -
to hold that classification by sex is inherently suspect.83
80 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
81 More accurately, the attorneys offered an "intermediate" standard - what attor-
neys called a "reasonable-relationship test" as an alternative. As the brief put it, "If the
Court concludes that sex is not a suspect classification, appellant urges application of
an intermediate test." Under this test, the Court would ask if the law was "arbitrary
and capricious and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate legislative purpose."
Brief for Appellants at 60, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (No. 70-4). It is worth
emphasizing, however, that this truly was a back-up position; the brief indeed stressed
the suspect classification route.
82 Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added).
83 W. William Hodes, A Disgruntled Look at Reed v. Reed, From the Vantage Point of the
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Hordes is correct to the extent that invocation of a traditional rational
basis standard probably would have spelled trouble for future litiga-
tion efforts. After all, under this standard, at least as the Court applies
it to economic legislation, the justices typically uphold laws. This is
true even for laws that they think are "needless and wasteful" or "un-
wise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought."84 In short, while the Idaho law at issue in Reed was suffi-
ciently arbitrary to fail the rational basis test, other laws and policies
might well survive it. Or at least that was Hordes's view.
Other scholars, however, were quite encouraged by the Reed deci-
sion. They argued that, although Burger claimed to be applying a
rational basis standard to the law, this was hardly the case. As Gunther
put it: "It is difficult to understand the result [in Reed] without an
assumption that some special sensitivity to sex as a classifying factor
entered into the analysis .... Only by importing some special suspi-
cion of sex-related means.., can the result be made entirely persua-
sive."as Reed was, in other words, a departure from the "traditional
deferential approach" inherent in the rational basis standard.
Goldstein agreed with this analysis. She called Reed "enforcement
of the reasonableness standard with bite." 6 Mezey too wrote that
The statute under attack in Reed was based on the reasonable
(and accurate) assumption that men generally had more busi-
ness experience than women. And although the law was more
defensible than others that had survived judicial scrutiny in the
past, the Supreme Court invalidated it. Perhaps signaling its de-
sire to enter a new phase of sex discrimination law, the Court
cited no sex discrimination case in its opinion.87
This last point is especially important. For, regardless of whether
one agrees with Hordes or Gunther, Reed constituted a major break
with the past. It was the first time the Court had ever invalidated a law
on the grounds that it constituted sex discrimination. The very fact
that the Court took this step surprised even Sally Reed's lawyers, in-
cluding Ginsburg. After all, Reed came just ten years after the Court,
in Hoyt v. f/orida,a declared:
Nineteenth Amendment, 2 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 9, 12 (1972), reprinted in H.H. KAY, SEx-
BASED DISCRIMINATION 38 (1981).
84 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-488 (1955).
85 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 34
(1972).
86 LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN 112
(1988).
87 SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, IN PuRsurr OF EQUALrrY 18 (1992).
88 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding a Florida law that automatically exempted wo-
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Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the re-
strictions and protections of bygone years, and their entry into
many parts of community life formerly considered to be re-
served to men, woman is still regarded as the center of home
and family life. We cannot say that it is constitutionally imper-
missible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to
conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of
jury service unless she herself determines that such service is
consistent with her own special responsibilities.
8 9
So it is hardly surprising that Ginsburg assessed her chances of
winning Reed as "nil."90 But win she did. At least on the merits of the
case, the Court held for Sally Reed. Still, the decision left open a
number of questions, with the most important one centering on the
classification for sex: would the Court continue to apply the rational
basis standard? If so, would it take the tack it did in Reed and apply the
test with a "bite"? Or would it revert to a more traditional approach?
Frontiero provided some answers to these questions and that, at least in
part, is what makes it such an important ruling.
Sharron Frontiero was a lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force, and her
husband, Joseph, was a full-time student at Huntingdon College in
Mobile, Alabama.91 Sharron applied for certain dependent benefits
for her husband, including medical and housing allowances. These
benefits were part of the package the military offered to be compet-
tive with private employers. To receive the benefits for her spouse,
Sharron had to prove thatJoseph was financially dependent upon her,
which meant that she provided at least half of her husband's support.
Male officers, however, were not required to provide evidence that
their wives were dependent upon them. Air Force regulations pre-
sumed such financial dependence.
According to the facts to which both parties agreed, Joseph's ex-
penditures amounted to $354 per month. He received $205 (58% of
his monthly expenses) from his own veterans' benefits. Consequently,
Joseph was not considered financially dependent on his wife, and the
benefits were denied.
When the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court, attorneys for the
Frontieros made the following claim: "Although Reed v. Reed em-
men from jury service unless they asked to serve), overruled by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522 (1975).
89 Hoyt, 368 U.S. at 61-62.
90 Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Rights through Litigation: An Examination of the American
Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLuM. HUM. RTS. L. Rrv. 378
(1977).
91 We draw these facts from LEE EPSTEIN & THOMAS WALKER, CONSTTUIONAL LAW
FOR A CHANGING AMERICA: RIGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 692 (1995).
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ployed the rational basis test to judge a sex classification, the Court
apparently left open the prospect that stricter review could be applied
in an appropriate case. This is such a case."9" Clearly, then, the
Frontieros' attorneys were pushing the suspect class approach; yet
they provided the Court with an alternative, albeit with some reluc-
tance: "Despite our position that the instant burdensome classifica-
tion by sex is suspect, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, the
plaintiffs submit that the challenged statutes fail even to meet the
traditional reasonableness test.""3
In an amicus curiae brief, attorneys for the Women's Rights Pro-
ject of the ACLU (again, including Ginsburg) approached the case
somewhat differently. They too urged the justices to find sex a suspect
class, but they were less circumspect about offering an alternative:
With respect to the standard of review in this case, our position
is three-fold: (1) [the challenged provisions] establish a suspect
classification for which no compelling justification can be
shown; alternatively, (2) the classification at issue, closely scruti-
nized, is not reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of any
legitimate legislative objective; and, finally, (3) without regard to
the suspect or invidious nature of the classification, the line
drawn by Congress, distinguishing between married servicemen
and married servicewomen for purposes of fringe benefits, lacks
the constitutionally required fair and reasonable relation to a
permissible legislative objective.
94
What would the Court do? Justices William J. Brennan, Jr.'s and
William 0. Douglas's notes from conference discussion are partially
revealing.95 They suggest that five of the justices (Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart, White and Powell) strongly believed, as Stewart put it, that
the policy "on its face grossly discriminates against a readily identifi-
able class in a basically fundamental role of life."96 Two others (Black-
mun and Marshall) cast tentative votes to reverse, while Burger and
Rehnquist thought the decision should be affirmed. In Burger's
mind, Reed had "nothing to do" with the case, a position with which
92 Brief for Appellants at 10-11, Frontiero v. Laird, 409 U.S. 840 (1972) (No. 71-
1694).
93 Id. at 33.
94 Brief for the American Civil Liberties Unions, amicus curiae at 23, Frontiero v.
Laird, 409 U.S. 840 (No. 71-1694).
95 We draw the following discussion from Brennan's and Douglas's notes from the
Court's conference on Frontier v. Richardson. Letter from William 0. Douglas, Associ-
ate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, to William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate
Justice, Supreme Court of the United States (March 3, 1973) (on file with the authors
and the New York City Law Review).
96 Id.
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Brennan took issue noting that he could not distinguish the two. Bur-
ger also said that he thought Frontiero was a "tempest in a teapot," with
"enormous" implications. These factors led Burger (and Rehnquist)
to conclude that the military had the right to draw the lines it did.97
The conference majority also, apparently, agreed that the Court
could dispose of the case without stating a specific standard of review.
For, on February 14, 1973, Brennan circulated the following memo,
along with the first draft of his majority opinion:
As you will note, I have structured this opinion along the lines
which reflect what I understood was our agreement at confer-
ence. That is, without reaching the question whether sex consti-
tutes a "suspect criterion" calling for "strict scrutiny," the
challenged provisions must fall for the reasons stated in Reed. I
do feel however that this case would provide an appropriate ve-
hicle for us to recognize sex as a "suspect criterion." And in
light of Potter [Stewart's] "Equal Protection Memo" circulated
last week,98 perhaps there is a Court for such an approach. If
so, I'd have no difficulty in writing the opinion along those
lines.
9 9
In other words, the first draft of Brennan's Frontiero opinion side-
stepped the classification issue and, instead, invoked a Reed approach
to dispose of the case. As he put it in his initial circulation:
At the outset, appellants contend that sex, like race, alienage,
and national origin, constitutes a "suspect criterion," and that a
classification based upon sex must therefore be deemed uncon-
97 Id.
98 Apparently, Brennan is referring here to a memo Stewart wrote to Powell on
February 8, 1973. In that memo, Stewart wrote: "Application of the so-called 'compel-
ling state interest' test automatically results, of course, in striking down the statute
under attack.... There is hardly a statute on the books that does not result in treat-
ing some people differently from others. There is hardly a statute on the books,
therefore, that an ingenious lawyer cannot attack under the Equal Protection Clause.
If he can persuade a court that [a fundamental interest] is involved, then the state
cannot possibly meet its resulting burden of proving that there was a compelling state
interest in enacting the statute exactly as it was written." BERNARD SCHWARTz, THE
ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: TiH BURGER COURT IN ACTION 220 (1990)
Stewart went on to say that the strict scrutiny approach could be dangerous be-
cause it would "return this Court, and all federal courts, to the heyday of the Nine Old
Men, who felt that the Constitution enabled them to invalidate almost any state laws
they thought unwise." Still, Stewart wrote in the memo that he thought "some few
classifications are suspect, notably and primarily race, but also others, including alien-
age, perhaps sex, perhaps illegitimacy, and indigency." Id. at 220-221.
Despite these words - and they were tentative - Stewart never again took the
position that sex should be a suspect class.
99 Memoranda from William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of
the United States, to the Conference, Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 14,
1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
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stitutional unless necessary to promote a compelling interest.
We need not, and therefore do not, decide this question, how-
ever, for we conclude that the instant statutes cannot pass consti-
tutional muster under even the more 'lenient' standard of
review implicit in our unanimous decision only last Term in Reed
v. Reed.10 0
Brennan went on to echo his conference position, namely, "[i]n terms
of the constitutional challenge, the situation here is virtually identical
to Reed,"101 and to reverse the lower court judgment.
The draft drew immediate responses from several members of the
Court. Powell quicklyjoined the opinion, 10 2 and took the opportunity
to state his opposition to considering the classification issue by stating:
"I see no reason to consider whether sex is a 'suspect' classifica-
tion in this case. Perhaps we can avoid confronting that issue
until we know the outcome of the Equal Rights Amendment."1
0 3
Stewart agreed with Powell but went one step further:
I see no need to decide in this case whether sex is a "suspect"
criterion, and I would not mention the question in the opinion.
I would, therefore, eliminate the first full paragraph on page 5
[this is the paragraph excerpted above], and substitute a state-
ment that we find that the classification effected by the statute is
invidiously discriminatory. (I should suppose that "invidious dis-
crimination" is an equal protection standard to which all could
repair, even though the dissenters would not find such discrimi-
nation in this case.)1 04
White, Douglas, and apparently Marshall, though, felt quite dif-
ferently. In a short note to Brennan, penned on the bottom of Bren-
nan's memo of February 14, Douglas said that he preferred the
suspect class approach. Marshall, who Douglas recorded as "tentative"
100 Draft opinion by Associate Justice WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., Supreme Court of the
United States, at 5 (Feb. 14, 1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law
R"view).
101 Id. at 7.
102 When justices agree to sign on to an opinion draft, they typically write a memo
to the writer saying that they "join" the opinion. Many simply write "I join" or "Join
me."
103 Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, to William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States (Feb. 15, 1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review) (At
the time Powell wrote this memo, 22 states had ratified the ERA; in fact, duringJanu-
ary, February, and March of 1973 alone, 8 states had approved it. It was not until after
March 1973 that the ratification pace slowed considerably.).
104 Letter from Potter Stewart, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, to William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States (Feb. 16, 1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
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at the justices' conference, had apparently solidified his views. In a
typed note, he wrote:
I share Bill Brennan's view that this case would provide an ap-
propriate vehicle for recognizing sex as a suspect criterion call-
ing for stricter review of the challenged class. Indeed, I would
have difficulty joining an opinion invalidating this classification
under a "rational relationship" test; and might ultimately be
forced to concur separately.1°5
Whether Marshall circulated this note is unclear. But he appar-
ently made his views known to some members of the Court - as the
following memo from White to Brennan reveals:
I think Reed v. Reed applied more than a rational basis test.
Thurgood is right about this. If moving beyond the lesser test
means that there is a suspect classification, then Reed has already
determined that. In any event, I would think that sex is a sus-
pect classification, if for no other reason than the fact that Con-
gress has submitted a constitutional amendment making sex
discrimination unconstitutional. I would remain of the same
view whether the amendment is adopted or not. Whether it fol-
lows from the existence of a suspect classification that "compel-
ling interest" is the equal protection standard is another matter.
I agree with Thurgood that we actually have a spectrum of stan-
dards. Rather than talking of a compelling interest, it would be
more accurate to say that there will be times - when there is a
suspect classification or when the classification impinges on a
constitutional right - that we will balance or weigh competing
interests. Of course, the more of this we do on the basis of sus-
pect classifications not rooted in the Constitution, the more we
approximate the old substantive due process approach.
10 6
So, by the end of February, the justices - while remaining of the
opinion that the lower court should be reversed - disagreed over the
appropriate standard of review. As Table 2 depicts, four justices
(White, Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan) thought the Court should
apply the suspect class approach and reverse; at least two others
wanted to reverse but on the Reed rational basis standard (Powell and
Stewart); and three remained silent during this initial circulation pe-
riod (Burger and Rehnquist who voted in conference to affirm and
Blackmun who had tentatively voted to reverse).
105 Thurgood Marshall, Note on Frontiero v. Laird, Feb.-Mar. 1993, located in Box
100 of the Thurgood Marshall collection at the Library of Congress (on file with the
authors and the New York City Law Review).
106 Letter from Byron R. White, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, to William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States (Feb. 15, 1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
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TABLE 2. PREFERENCES IN FROATIERO V. RICHARDSOaN CONFERENCE
VOTES AND POSITIONS AFTER BRENNAN CIRCULATED HIS
FIRST DRAFT*
Justice Conference Vote Position on Standard of Review:
Reactions to Brennan's First
Draft
Burger Against Frontiero No reaction
Douglas For Frontiero Preferred Suspect Class
Brennan For Frontiero Preferred Suspect Class
Stewart For Frontiero Preferred Draft as is (Rational
Basis)
White For Frontiero Preferred Suspect Class
Marshall For Frontiero Preferred Suspect Class
(tentative)
Powell For Frontiero Preferred Draft as is (Rational
Basis)
Blackmun For Frontiero No reaction
(tentative)
Rehnquist Against Frontiero No reaction
* Data collected by the authors.
This preference configuration created something of a quandary
for Brennan. When Douglas assigned the opinion to him,10 7 Brennan
knew, as do all justices, that he needed to obtain the signatures of at
least four others if his opinion was to become the law of the land. If
he failed to get a majority to agree to its contents, his opinion would
become a "judgment of the Court," and would lack precedential
value.
The "majority" requirement for precedent is another of the
Court's many norms and, in Frontiero, a seemingly imposing one. For,
from Brennan's perspective, only three other justices (Marshall,
White, and Douglas) agreed with his most preferred positions in the
case: reversal of the lower court decision and application of a strict
scrutiny standard. From where would the fourth vote come? Rehn-
quist and Burger were out of the question. Not only did they disagree
with Brennan over the appropriate standard of review (they favored
rational basis), but they even disagreed over the disposition of the
case (they favored affirmation). Powell and Stewart were closer to
Brennan - at least they wanted to reverse - but they made it crystal
107 Douglas, as the senior member of the majority, assigned the opinion to
Brennan.
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clear that they wanted to use the Reed rationale. If Brennan failed to
do so, they might pull their support.
That left Blackmun. He had several feasible courses of action,
which Table 3 depicts: join the majority opinion, concur "regularly,"
concur "specially," or dissent. Based on his conference position - an
inclination to reverse without providing a clear statement of the stan-
dard - it was possible that Blackmun (as well as Powell and Stewart)
might join Brennan's disposition of the case (that Frontiero should
win), but disagree with the standard the opinion articulated (strict
scrutiny). This would not be propitious from Brennan's perspective
because such disagreement - called a "special" concurrence -
would mean that Blackmun would fail to provide the crucial fifth sig-
nature. On the other hand, Blackmun might simply join the majority
opinion coalition while writing a "regular" concurrence. Since a regu-
lar concurrence, in contrast to a special concurrence, counts as join-
ing the majority opinion, Brennan would have his fifth vote.
If Brennan is a rational actor, whose goal is to set policy as close
as possible to his ideal point (in this instance, a suspect classification
for sex), what would PPT predict Brennan would do? Stick with his
first opinion draft which adopted the rational basis approach or circu-
late a new draft which would apply strict scrutiny? To address this
question, we begin by conceptualizing Brennan's situation as a
"game" loa - one pitting him (as an advocate of suspect class) against
Powell/Stewart" 9 (as justices content with the rational basis ap-
proach). Moreover, based on the memoranda we have compiled, it
seems reasonable to assume that both "players" - Brennan and Pow-
ell/Stewart - shared the following beliefs about their Frontiero inter-
action. First, both players believed that, regardless of whether
Brennan adopted a rational basis standard or a suspect class standard,
the majority of the justices would agree to reverse the lower court's
decision. Given the conference vote (7-2) and the memoranda of the
justices, this seems like a reasonable assumption and one that Bren-
nan and Powell/Stewart probably took as a given. The choice for the
108 In game theoretic terms, a game is a strategic situation. As Cameron puts it,
"Technically, this means that the fate of each actor must depend on the decisions of
other actors (not just his or her own actions), and the actors must realize their inter-
dependence. For example, the outcome of cases in federal appellate courts depend
on the individual votes of several judges sitting as a panel. Plausibly, the judges care
about the outcome of cases, and they certainly recognize that outcomes depend on
their collective behavior. Hence, voting in appellate adjudication is technically a
game." Cameron, supra note 59, at 2-3.
109 Since Powell and Stewart agreed on the desirable outcome - a victory for Fron-
tiero - and on the standard of law to obtain that outcome - a rational basis test -
we treat them as one player.
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2. Write or Join' a
Regular Concurrence
3. Write or Join a Special
Concurrenced
4. Write orJoine a Dissent f
The justice is a "voiceless" member of the
majority'. That is, the justice writes no
opinion but simply agrees with the
opinion' of the Court.
The justice writes (or joins) an opinion
and is also a member of the majority'
opinion coalition.
The justice agrees with the disposition
made by the majority' but disagrees with
the reasons contained in the opinion. The
justice is not a member of the majority
opinion coalition!
The justice disagrees with the disposition
made by the majority. The justice is not a
member of the majority' opinion
coalition.
aOr the plurality, if the opinion writer can't get a majority of justices to agree to
the opinion's contents.
bOr the judgment of the Court. A judgment of the Court results when the opinion
writer can't get a majority of the participating justices to agree to the opinion's
contents.
CTo join is to sign on to an opinion.
d Or simply note such a concurrence, as in "Justice Stewart concurs in the judgment
of the Court."
eThus, at least one justice must cast such a concurrence to produce a Judgment of
the Court.
fOr simply note such dissent, as in "Justice Stewart dissents."
* Adopted ftom: SEGAL AND SPAETH, supra note 2, at 276.
two players, then, boiled down to the choice of a legal standard
suspect class or rational basis. Second, both players knew with a good
deal of certainty their opponent's preferences. That is, Brennan
wanted a suspect class, while Powell/Stewart desired a rational basis
standard. Although there are several ways we could set out those pref-
erences, let us suppose that both players cared more about policy than
about marshaling a Court behind a particular approach, and that they
believed the other knew this. In other words, Brennan preferred a
suspect class majority opinion to a suspect class judgment to a rational
basis opinion; Powell/Stewart's preferences were precisely the oppo-
site. Third, both players were uncertain about Blackmun's position in
the case. Recall that Blackmun's conference vote was tentative and
that he had not circulated any response to Brennan's first draft.
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With these preferences and beliefs in mind, we can now turn to
the key question: what are the rational courses of action for these
actors? The answer is straightforward enough: Given Brennan's pref-
erences (he preferred a suspect majority opinion to a suspect judg-
ment to a rational basis opinion), his beliefs about the preferences of
the other actors and the actions he expected them to take (he knew
Powell/Stewart preferred rational basis), and the context (he was un-
certain about Blackmun's position), we might hypothesize that Bren-
nan would recraft his opinion to adopt a suspect class for sex, and that
Powell/Stewart would take the rational basis route - and concur in
judgment. Thejustices would make these decisions regardless of what
they thought Blackmun would do.
To see this, readers need only put themselves in the actors' posi-
tions and believe, for example, that there was a 95% chance that
Blackmun would choose the suspect classification. If that were the
case, then surely Brennan would choose the suspect class route (for
the chances of obtaining a Court behind a suspect class opinion would
be quite high) and Powell/Stewart would choose the rational basis
path (even though they would know that the odds of obtaining a ra-
tional basis opinion or a judgment were quite small). If we reversed
the situation and posited that there was only a .5 probability of Black-
mun going suspect, the same results would be obtained. For, if Bren-
nan continued to embrace the rational choice standard under these
circumstances, then surely Blackmun, Stewart, and Powell would have
rallied around his opinion. Burger and Rehnquist, though disagree-
ing with the use of the standard to reverse, would also have articulated
a rational basis approach. This would have created a Court behind
the rational basis approach - Brennan's least preferred standard.
Thus, it is not so surprising that Brennan, on February 28, 1973,
took the rational course of action and circulated a new draft of his
opinion with a memo attached stating: "[s]ince the previous circula-
tion attracted only Lewis's full agreement and Potter's partial agree-
ment, and since Bill Douglas and Byron have indicated a preference
for the "suspect criterion" approach, the attached new circulation em-
bodies the latter approach (which is also my own preference)."" In-
deed, this draft (which resembles the final, published version)
explicitly held that "classifications based upon sex, like classifications
based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect,
and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. Applying
110 Memoranda from William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of
the United States, to the Conference, Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 28,
1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
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the analysis mandated by that stricter standard of review, we can only
conclude that the statutory scheme now before us is constitutionally
invalid.""'
The reactions were predictable. White, Douglas, and Marshall
immediately joined the new draft. Powell, however, refused to do so.
In a March 2, 1973, memorandum to Brennan, Powell wrote:
This refers to your ... draft opinion in the above case, in which
you have now gone all the way in holding that sex is a "suspect
classification."
My principal concern about going this far at this time, as indi-
cated in my earlier letter, is that it places the Court in the posi-
tion of preempting the amendatory process initiated by
Congress. If the Equal Rights Amendment is duly adopted, it
will represent the will of the people accomplished in the man-
ner prescribed by the Constitution. If, on the other hand, this
Court puts "sex" in the same category as "race" we will have as-
sumed a decisional responsibility (not within the democratic
process) unnecessary to the decision of this case, and at the very
time that legislatures around the country are debating the genu-
ine pros and cons of how far it is wise, fair and prudent to sub-
ject both sexes to identical responsibilities as well as rights.
The point of this letter is not to debate the merits of the Equal
Rights Amendment, as to which reasonable persons obviously
may differ. Rather, it is to question the desirability of this Court
reaching out to anticipate a major political decision which is
currently in process of resolution by the duly prescribed consti-
tutional process.
I joined your opinion in its original draft on the authority of
Reed v. Reed. This is as far as we need go in the case now before
us. If and when it becomes necessary to consider whether sex is
a suspect classification, I will find the issue a difficult one. Wo-
men certainly have not been treated as being fungible with men
(thank God!). Yet, the reasons for different treatment have in
no way resembled the purposeful and invidious discrimination
directed against blacks and aliens. Nor may it be said any longer
that, as a class, women are a discrete minority barred from effec-
tive participation in the political process.
For these reasons, I cannot join your new opinion and will await
further circulations.'12
111 Draft opinion by Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Supreme Court of the
United States, at 11 (Feb. 28, 1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City
Law Review).
112 Letter from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, to William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States (Mar. 2, 1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
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Stewart immediately told Brennan that he agreed with Powell.
That left Blackmun, who had not expressed an opinion on either
of Brennan's drafts. So whatever hopes Brennan had for marshaling a
Court hung on him. But Blackmun did not leave Brennan hanging
for long. In a March 5 memo, Blackmun wrote:
This case has afforded me a good bit of difficulty. After some
struggle, I have now concluded that it is not advisable, and cer-
tainly not necessary, for us to reach out in this case to hold that
sex, like race and national origin and alienage, is a suspect clas-
sification. It seems to me that Reed v. Reed is ample precedent
here and is all we need and that we should not, by this case,
enter the arena of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.
This places me, I believe, essentially where Lewis and Potter are
as reflected by their respective letters of March 2 and February
16.
n13
Brennan tried to salvage the situation. The day after he heard from
Blackmun, he wrote to Powell:
You make a strong argument and I have given it much thought.
I come out however still of the view that the "suspect" approach
is the proper one and, further, that now is the time, and this is
the case, to make that clear. Two reasons primarily underlie my
feeling. First, Thurgood's discussion of Reed in his dissent to
your Rodriguez convinces me that the only rational explication of
Reed is that it rests upon the "suspect" approach. Second, we
cannot count on the Equal Rights Amendment to make the
Equal Protection issue go away. Eleven states have now voted
against ratification (Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana,
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Utah and Virginia). And within the next month or two, at least
two, and probably four, more states (Arizona, Mississippi, Mis-
souri and Georgia) are expected to vote against ratification.
Since rejection in 13 states is sufficient to kill the Amendment it
looks like a lost cause. Although rejections may be rescinded at
any time before March 1979, the trend is rather to rescind ratifi-
cation in some states that have approved it. I therefore don't
see that we gain anything by awaiting what is at best an uncer-
tain outcome. Moreover, whether or not the Equal Rights
Amendment eventually is ratified, we cannot ignore the fact that
Congress and the legislatures of more than half the States have
already determined that classifications based upon sex are in-
herently suspect." 4
1 Letter from Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, to William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States (Mar. 5, 1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
114 Letter from William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the
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This was insufficient, however, to persuade Powell to change his mind.
At the end of the day, Brennan failed to bring a Court together (i.e.,
his writing was ajudgment, not a majority opinion). As Table 4 shows,
only four justices supported the strict scrutiny standard, with the rest
advocating rational basis.
TABLE 4. FINAL VOTES CAST IN AND TESTS ADOPTED BY JUSTICES
IN FROANIERO*
Position on Standard of Review:
Justice Final Vote Reactions to Brennan's Final Draft
Burger For Frontieroa Rational Basis
Douglas For Frontiero Suspect Class
Brennan For Frontiero Suspect Class
Stewart For Frontiero Undeclared
White For Frontiero Suspect Class
Marshall For Frontiero Suspect Class
Powell For Frontiero Rational Basis
Blackmun For Frontiero Rational Basis
Rehnquist Against Frontiero Rational Basis
Woted against Frontiero at conference.
* Data collected by the authors.
B. From Frontiero v. Richardson to Craig v. Boren
Despite his failure to forge a majority in Frontiero, Brennan,
given his beliefs, preferences, and the context of the decision, took
the rational course of action when he rewrote the first draft to
adopt a strict scrutiny standard. As such, we think Brennan's deci-
sion provides an interesting example of the utility of the strategic
rationality approach.
The decision also kept the hopes of women's rights litigators
alive. As Schwartz put it, "[h]ad the Brennan [first draft] come
down as the Frontiero opinion, it might well have aborted the sub-
stantial development of sex discrimination law that occurred in the
Burger Court. The use of the rational-basis test in both Reed and
Frontiero would probably have meant its adoption for all cases in-
volving sexual classification."'1 5 But, because Frontiero did not deci-
sively reject or accept the suspect class test, several women's rights
groups continued their efforts to convince the Court to adopt the
higher level of scrutiny, and the Court continued to decide such
United States, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States (Mar. 6, 1973) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
115 Sc-wARTz, supra note 98, at 223.
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disputes. Between 1973 (Frontiero) and 1976 (Craig), as Table 5
shows, the Court resolved, with a signed opinion, ten cases involv-
ing sex discrimination, with the litigant claiming discrimination
prevailing in six of the cases.
TABLE 5. SEX DISCRIMINATION CASES DECIDED BY THE COURT
BETWEEN FRONTIERO AND CRAIG*
Case Vote Outcome
Pittsburgh Press v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) 5-4 +
Cleveland Board of Education v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632
(1974) 7-2 +
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) 6-3 -
Corning Glass v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974) 5-3 +
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) 6-3 -
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) 5-4 -
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) 8-1 +
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) 8-0 +
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) 8-1 +
General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) 6-3 -
Note: + = Court struck down sex-based classification; - = Court upheld sex-based
classification.
* MEZEY, supra note 87, at 22-23; O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S ORGANIZAnONS' USE OF THE
COURTS 96-97 (1980).
Still, the Court apparently could not agree over the legal standard
by which to adjudicate constitutional cases. Indeed, in Stanton v. Stan-
ton,' 16 a case quite proximate to Craig, the Court seemed to give up
the search for an appropriate test. At issue in Stanton was a Utah law
which specified that, for purposes of child support payments, men
reach adulthood at age 21 and women at 18. Writing for the Court,
Justice Blackmun held that the law constituted impermissible sex dis-
crimination, but it failed to articulate a standard of review. Instead,
the majority opinion noted: "[w]e. .. conclude that under any test -
compelling state interest, rational basis, or something in between -
[the Utah law] ... does not survive... attack."1 7
Such rulings sent mixed signals to the legal community. As one
federal district court judge put it, "lower courts searching for gui-
dance in the 1970s Supreme Court sex discrimination precedents
[prior to Craig] have 'an uncomfortable feeling' - like players at a
116 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
117 Id. at 17.
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shell game who are 'not absolutely sure there is a pea.' "118 Attorneys
working in this area of the law found themselves in much the same
boat. At the very least, though, women's rights attorneys and organi-
zations knew, as Table 5 shows, that they had five justices on whose
votes they could generally (but not always) count: Brennan, White,
Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart. But the potential for change was in
the wind when Douglas retired and President Ford replaced him with
John Paul Stevens. Would Stevens support women's right claims?
What classification would he favor?
These questions loomed large when the Court agreed to decide
Craig v. BorenL At issue in Craigwas an "equalization" statute passed by
Oklahoma in 1972.119 This law set the age of the legal majority for
both males and females at eighteen.12 0 Before then, females reached
legal age at eighteen and males at twenty-one.12' The statute, how-
ever, contained one exception. The law prohibited men from
purchasing beer until they reached the age of 21, but allowed women
to buy (low-alcohol content) beer at 18.122 The state differentiated
between the sexes in response to statistical evidence indicating a
greater tendency for males in the eighteen to twenty-one age bracket
to be involved in alcohol-related traffic accidents, including
fatalities.
23
Even so, Curtis Craig, a 20 year-old male who wanted to buy beer
and Carolyn Whitener, a beer vendor who wanted to sell it, viewed
the law as a form of sex discriminaiion and brought suit in a federal
district court.124 At the district court level one of the arguments the
plaintiffs made was that under Frontiero, laws discriminating on the
basis of sex should be, at least according to the U.S. Supreme Court,
subject to the "strict scrutiny" test.1 5 The plaintiffs contended that
under this standard the Oklahoma law could not stand because com-
pelling governmental interest was not achieved by establishing differ-
ent drinking ages for men and women.1
2 6
In response, the state argued that the U.S. Supreme Court had
never explicitly applied the strict scrutiny test to laws discriminating
118 KAY, supra note 83, at 70.
"9 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
120 Id. at 192.
121 Id. at 200-01.
122 Id. at 192.
123 Id. at 200-01.
124 Id. at 192.
125 Walker v. Hall. 399 F. Supp. 1304, 1307 (W.D. Okla. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Craig
v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
126 Id.
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on the basis of sex.' 27 Rather, the only test that a majority of thejus-
tices had ever applied was the Reed rational basis approach. 2 Surely,
Oklahoma contended, its law met this standard because statistical
studies indicated that men "drive more, drink more, and commit
more alcohol-related offenses."" r
A three-judge district court held for the state, upholding the con-
stitutionality of the statute."' 0 While the court acknowledged that ex-
isting U.S. Supreme Court decisions were murky, it felt that the weight
of the case law supported the state's reliance on the lower-level stan-
dard. 11 Furthermore, the court held that the state had met its obliga-
tion of establishing a "rational basis" for the law: given the statistical
evidence, Oklahoma's goal of reducing drunk-driving incidents
seemed a reasonable one.'
3 2
At the U.S. Supreme Court, Craig and Whitener continued to
press the same claims that they had at trial (with Craig and Whitener
arguing for strict scrutiny and the state advocating rational basis), but
a third party advanced a somewhat different approach. Entering the
case as an amicus curiae on behalf of Craig, ACLU attorneys Ruth
Bader Ginsburg and Melvin Wulf argued that the Oklahoma law
"could not survive review whatever the appropriate test:" strict scrutiny
or rational basis or "something in between."' 3 3 This was an argument
drawn directly from the Court's indecisiveness in Stanton,' and it was
interesting in two regards: it suggested that (1) the Court could apply
the lower rational basis standard and still hold for Craig or (2) the
Court might consider developing a standard "in between" strict scru-
tiny and rational basis.
What would the Supreme Court do?
That question was initially answered at the justices' conference,
held a few days after oral arguments.'3 5 As is the Court's tradition, the
Chief Justice led off the discussion. Burger asserted that Craig was an
"isolated case" which the Court should dismiss on procedural
grounds. The problem was that since Curtis Craig had turned 21 after
127 Brief for Appellees at 3-4, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (No. 75-628).
128 Id.
129 Walker, 399 F. Supp. at 1309.
130 Id. at 1314.
'3' Id. at 1308.
132 Id. at 1311.
133 Brief for the American Civil Liberties Unions, amicus curiae at 15-17, Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (No. 75-628).
134 Id.
135 The next few paragraphs draw on the case files and docket books (which in-
clude notes of conference discussion) of Justices William J. Brennan, Jr. and
Thurgood Marshall (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
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the Court agreed to hear the case, his claim was moot. Thus, the dis-
positive issue, to Burger, was whether or not "the saloon keeper" Whit-
ener had standing to bring the suit.13 6 Burger thought that she did
not. But, if his colleagues disagreed (that is, they thought Whitener
had standing), Burger said he was willing to find for Craig providing
that the majority opinion was narrowly written.
13 7
After Burger spoke, the other justices presented their views. They
were, as Table 6 illustrates, all over the map. Powell and Blackmun
agreed with the Chief Justice in that they both would dismiss on the
standing issue, and they both thought that they could find for Craig.
Rehnquist also wanted to dismiss on the standing issue but would hold
for Oklahoma should the Court resolve the dispute. The remaining
five justices would rule in Craig's favor but disagreed on the appropri-
ate standard. Marshall clearly favored strict scrutiny, as did William
Brennan, but Brennan suggested that a standard in between rational
and strict might be viable;"s White seemed to go along with Brennan;
Stewart seemed to suggest that the Court need only apply the rational
basis test to find in Craig's favor, Stevens argued that some "level of
scrutiny above mere rationality has to be applied," but he was not
clear on what that standard should be.
After the conference, it was Brennan who decided to write the
opinion for the Court' 39 Again, this was a rather daunting task, for,
from Brennan's perspective, at most only three other justices (Mar-
shall and, possibly, White and Stevens) tended to agree with his most
preferred positions in the case: (1) Whitener had standing (2) a strict
scrutiny standard should be used, and (3) the Court should rule in
Craig's favor. From where would the fourth vote come? Not from
Rehnquist, as his position was diametrically opposed to Brennan's on
all the key points and, thus, he would surely dissent. The sentiments
136 The doctrine of "standing" prohibits the Court from resolving a dispute if the
party bringing the litigation is not the appropriate one. In other words, Article III of
the U.S. Constitution requires that the litigants demonstrate "such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
In Craig v. Boren, Burger felt that Whitener, being over the age of 21 and female,
did not have the requisite personal stake. Again, this was a dispositive point for Bur-
ger since Craig's claim was moot. Craig, 429 U.S. at 190.
137 Letter from Warren E. Burger, Chief justice, Supreme Court of the United
States, to William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States (Nov. 15, 1976) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
1s8 ScxwARTz, supra note 98, at 226.
139 Letter from William J. Brennan, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the
United States, to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United
States (Nov. 16, 1976) (on file with the authors and the New York City Law Review).
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TABLE 6. JusTIcEs' CONFERENCE POSITIONS ON THE KEY ISSUES OF
C, AiG v. BOREN
Justice Conference Position
Standing Standard Disposition
Burger No Rational? Dismiss/Lean toward Craig
if decided on merits
Brennan Yes Strict/In-Between* Craig
Stewart Yes Rational Craig
White Yes Strict/In-Between? Craig
Marshall Yes Strict Craig
Blackmun No Undeclared Dismiss/Lean toward Craig
if decided on merits
Powell No Rational? Dismiss/Lean toward Craig
if decided on merits
Rehnquist No Rational Dismiss/Lean toward
Oklahoma if decided on
merits
Stevens Yes Above Rational Craig
?=Implicit but not explicit from conference discussion.
* Typically, Brennan's case files contain memos of the remarks he made at
conferences. Unfortunately, his Craig conference memo was missing. So we rely on
SciWARrz, supra note 98, at 226, who writes that Brennan, of course, wanted to
adopt the strict scrutiny approach but offered the "in between" standard as a
compromise. For now, the important point is that "strict" represented Brennan's
most preferred position.
of Blackmun, Powell, and Burger too favored dismissal, but were
closer to Brennan on point (3).
That left Stewart, who was in the same "make-or-break" position
in which Blackmun found himself in Frontiero and who had the same
feasible courses of action: join the majority opinion, concur "regu-
larly," concur "specially," or dissent. Based on his conference position
(he had voted in favor of standing and for Craig but was not keen on
the strict scrutiny approach) and on the memorandum he circulated
in Frontiero, it was possible that Stewart (as well as Blackmun, Powell
and Burger) mightjoin Brennan's disposition of the case (that Craig
should win), but disagree with the standard the opinion articulated
(strict scrutiny or, even, something "in between"). If this occurred,
then once again Brennan would end up issuing a judgment in the
case, rather than a majority opinion. On the other hand, Stewart
might simply join the majority opinion coalition while writing a "regu-
lar" concurrence. Since a regular concurrence (in contrast to a spe-
cial concurrence) includes agreement with the majority opinion,
Brennan would have his fifth vote in Stewart.
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After several opinion drafts, revised to accommodate the many
suggestions of his colleagues, Brennan accomplished what he could
not in Frontiero. He succeeded in marshaling a majority behind his
Craig opinion. The final version incorporated the ACLU's suggestion
(and Brennan's own conference alternative), and articulated a test for
sex discrimination cases, called "heightened" (or mid-level) scrutiny,
that fell somewhere between strict scrutiny and rational basis. 40
From there, the votes and positions fell out as Table 7 indicates. Note
that neither Powell nor Burger nor Blackmun joined opinions that
followed from their conference votes and that Marshall signed an
opinion advocating a standard that was less than ideal from his point
of view, and that Brennan's writing advanced a sex discrimination test
that fell short of his most preferred standard. Even the votes of cer-
tain justices changed. Powell, Blackmun and Burger switched their
positions, though in different directions.
In the end, thus, Craig leaves us with many unanswered questions.
Why did Powell, Blackmun, and Burger switch their votes? Why did
Brennan advance the "heightened scrutiny" test when he clearly fa-
vored "strict scrutiny"? Why did Marshall join Brennan's opinion,
when it adopted a standard he found less-then-appealing? More gen-
erally, why did Craig come out the way it did?
Here we concentrate primarily on one of these questions -
Brennan's decision to advance heightened scrutiny over a suspect clas-
sification - because its answer gives us some insight into the last and
most important question of why Craig came out the way it did. In
response, we argue that PPT provides us with leverage to address both
questions. For we believe that, given his preferences, his beliefs about
the preferences of others, and the institutional context, Brennan took
the course of action in Craig that any rational actor, concerned with
policy, would have taken.
Let us begin with Brennan's preferences and his beliefs about the
preferences of other Court members. Suppose, in Craig, that all of the
justices agreed on all of the key issues: (1) Whitener had standing,
(2) a strict scrutiny standard should be used, and (3) the Court should
rule in Craig's favor. If this were the case, then Brennan would have
been free to write an opinion that reflected his sincere preferences,
140 Brennan outlined the heightened scrutiny approach as follows: "classifications
by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to the achievement of those objectives." Under this approach the Court some-
times strikes down sex-based classifications (such as establishing different drinking
ages for men and women, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 192) and occasionally upholds
them (such as limiting the military draft to men, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57
(1981)).
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TABLE 7. POSITIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES ON THE KEY
ISSUES OF CRAiG v. BoREN
Justice Conference Position Final Position
Standing Standard Disposition Standing Standard Disposition
Burger No Rational? Dismiss/ No Rational OK
Craig
Brennan Yes Strict/In- Craig Yes Heightened Craig
Between*
Stewart Yes Rational Craig Yes Rational Craig
White Yes Strict/In- Craig Yes Heightened Craig
Between?
Marshall Yes Strict Craig Yes Heightened Craig
Blackmun No Undeclared Dismiss/ Yes Heightened Craig'
Craig
Powell No Rational? Dismiss/ Yes Heightened** Craigd
Craig
Rehnquist No Rational Dismiss/OK No Rational OK
Stevens Yes Above Craig Yes Heightened** Craigd
Rational
?= Implicit but not explicit from conference discussion.
*See note on Table 6.
"With reservations or qualifications
'=Wrote dissenting opinion
b=Wrote opinion concurring in judgment (special concurrence)
'=Wrote opinion concurring in part
d=Wrote concurring opinion (regular concurrence)
for they were the same as the Court's. However, that was not the case
in Craig. As we know, Brennan had to choose among three possible
standards and that he preferred strict scrutiny over heightened scru-
tiny over rational basis. Yet, he did not select his most preferred stan-
dard, opting instead for his second choice. Why? A real possibility is
that Brennan knew from the confabs over Frontiero that an opinion
advancing strict scrutiny would have proven to be too much for cer-
tain members of the Court to handle - and that they would have
pushed for a rational basis standard. Even more pointedly, he may
have even thought that situation had worsened since Frontiero: a clear
suspect class supporter (Douglas) had been replaced by ajustice (Ste-
vens) with less certain predilections. Thus, Brennan may have chosen
heightened scrutiny because, based on his knowledge of the prefer-
ences of other justices, it allowed him to avoid his least preferred posi-
tion (rational basis), and not because it was his first choice. Seen in
this light, strategic calculations led Brennan to act in a sophisticated
fashion so as to avoid the possibility of seeing his most preferred pol-
icy (suspect) rejected by his colleagues in favor of his least preferred
policy (rational).
In so doing and to reiterate, Brennan took the rational course of
action. In other words, for Brennan to set policy as close as possible to
POSITIVE POIJTICAL THEORY
his ideal point, which, recall, is the primary goal most PPTheorists
ascribe to all justices, strategic behavior was essential. Moreover, in
this instance, Brennan needed to act in a sophisticated fashion, given
his beliefs about the preferences of the other actors and the choices
he expected them to make.
Under the PPT framework, though, strategic considerations do
not simply involve calculations over what colleagues will do. For rea-
sons considered earlier in this article, justices also consider the prefer-
ences of other key political actors, including Congress, the President,
and even the public. We think these considerations may have played a
role in Brennan's ultimate decision to adopt the heightened scrutiny
approach in Craig. Recall that at the time the Court was deciding the
case (1976), it believed that Congress favored a strict-scrutiny ap-
proach to sex-based classifications."' Brennan said as much in
Frontier.
[O]ver the past decade, Congress itself has manifested an in-
creasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications .... [T] he Equal
Pay Act of 1963 provides that no employer covered by the Act
'shall discriminate ... between employees on the basis of sex.'
And Section 1 of the Equal Rights Amendment, passed by Con-
gress on March 22, 1972, and submitted to the legislatures of the
States for ratification, declares that '[e]quality of rights under
the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of sex.' Thus, Congress itself has concluded
that classifications based upon sex are inherently invidious ....42
The Court had little reason, in 1976, to think that Congress's prefer-
ences had changed. In fact, both Houses continued to support the
ERA and, thus (under Brennan's logic), a strict-scrutiny approach to
sex-based classifications.
Let us assume that at the time the Court was deciding Craig, a
majority of justices viewed the political situation in the way we have
described it, that is, the Court favored a lower level of scrutiny than
the other branches of government. 143 What standard would a strate-
gic policy-maximizing Court advance? Under these circumstances, it
would have been unwise for the Court to vote its sincere preferences.
If the Court articulated a rational basis standard, Congress may have
attempted to override its decision by writing a "strict scrutiny" test into
141 See GOLDSrEIN, supra note 86.
142 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687 (1973) (emphasis added).
143 Recall that after a conference discussion of Craig, a majority ofjustices wanted to
dismiss the case (Blackmun, Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist) or apply a rational basis
test (Stewart). See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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law. 14 As a result, the Court had a "strong incentive" to compromise
its preferences and adopt some kind of a mid-level approach (e.g.,
heightened scrutiny) - or, at least, one that Congress believed was
the best it could do under the circumstances and, accordingly, would
have left undisturbed.
Of course, and once again, by acting in this sort of sophisticated
fashion the Court would neither see its most preferred position (ra-
tional basis) nor its least preferred position (strict scrutiny) written
into law. Yet, this course of action, the rational course of action under
the circumstances, would lead to the best possible outcome for the
majority, heightened scrutiny. This was somethingJustice Brennan, as
the opinion writer, seemed to understand.
Finally, just as PPT suggests, it is difficult to understand the
Court's opinion in Craig without taking into account a key institution
- the norm governing the creation of precedent. If Brennan be-
lieved that four other justices shared his preference for strict scrutiny
over rational basis, then surely he would have written an opinion
adopting the strict standard. But that was not the case. Only three
justices (at the very most) were firmly behind him. This, as we sug-
gested earlier, may explain why he was willing to consider the height-
ened standard. Given the norm for precedent, he thought
"heightened" was the best he could do.
IV. CONCLUSION
William J. Brennan, Jr. played a crucial role in the develop-
ment of contemporary sex discrimination law. From the time of
the Reed decision in 1971 until Craig in 1976 the Court was sharply
divided over the appropriate standard to apply in sex-based claims.
If the justices voted on the basis of their sincere preferences the
144 Those readers who doubt that Congress would pass legislation directing the
Court to apply a particular standard of law need only consider the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993. Passed to undercut the Court's decision in Oregon v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (in which the Court ruled that Oregon could deny unemploy-
ment benefits to individuals fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote at a religious
ceremony), the Act implicitly directed the Court to use a compelling interest standard
to adjudicate First Amendment Free Exercise claims.
Still our discussion of Craig oversimplifies (1) the politics of the day (for exam-
ple, by the time the Court decided Craig the drive to ratify the ERA had slowed consid-
erably, even though Congress continued to back the amendment - as its extension
of the ratification deadline attests) and (2) the separation of powers system as it per-
tains to constitutional interpretation. We use it here to make a basic point, namely
that policy-oriented justices need consider the preferences of other political actors
and the choices they expect them to make.
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Court would remain deadlocked, unable to achieve majority sup-
port for any particular standard.
Throughout this period Brennan carried a strong preference
for the application of a strict scrutiny standard to sex discrimina-
tion cases. Yet, he found himself without sufficient support from
his colleagues to realize his policy goal. While his sincere prefer-
ence never changed, he successfully adapted to conditions inside
the Court. By acting strategically, he was able to prevent the major-
ity from etching into law his least preferred outcome (rational ba-
sis). Although he never saw his most preferred position become
the law of the land, he was able to set law as close as was possible to
his ideal point by articulating an "in between" approach that con-
tinues to be used in sex discrimination cases.
Brennan's advancement and the Court's ultimate adoption of
the heightened scrutiny standard - and this is a key point - can-
not be adequately explained by existing models of Supreme Court
decision making. To see why, reconsider the events leading up to
Craig. Having been assigned the task of writing for the majority in
Frontiero, Brennan faced a difficult situation. Although a clear ma-
jority supported the position that the Air Force regulations violated
the Constitution, the justices apparently agreed to base the deci-
sion on an application of Reed, preferring not to use the case as a
vehicle for articulating a particular standard.
Brennan's first draft was true to this position, but he openly
declared in a memorandum that he supported the suspect class
approach. When White, Douglas, and Marshall echoed his senti-
ment, Brennan reassessed his initial circulation. He now had four
votes in support of strict scrutiny, but could he attract a fifth? With
Rehnquist and Burger in dissent, and Powell and Stewart prefer-
ring that the Court avoid the issue, the spotlight inside the Court
fell on Blackmun, who had not declared a position. With this vot-
ing alignment, Brennan took the rational course of action - he
scrapped his Reed-based draft and circulated an opinion embracing
strict scrutiny. Doing so carried little risk and the potential for sig-
nificant reward. If he attracted Blackmun to his camp, he would
have won a major policy victory; if Blackmun could not be swayed
(which proved to be the case), Brennan would still block adoption
of the rational choice approach and keep the legal debate alive.
In Craig, Brennan faced an altered social context. Majority
support for strict scrutiny seemed beyond reach. With the retire-
ment of Douglas and Blackmun's rejection of the approach, Bren-
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nan had no hope of gaining support for his sincerely preferred
position.
Apparently aware of this changed context, Brennan again ac-
ted strategically. He took advantage of the Court's rules by as-
signing Craig to himself. Then, he carefully crafted a new standard
of review - a standard that he thought would allow him to main-
tain the support of White and Marshall and would attract others
who generally favored Craig, but were not necessarily strict scrutiny
advocates. Brennan's approach was successful: a majority of the
justices signed his opinion.
By now, it should be clear why existing theories of decision
making cannot account for the development of sex discrimination
standards. Surely the intra-court negotiations in Frontiero and
Craig bear no resemblance to the kinds of behavior suggested by
purely legal models of decision making. At the very least, Justice
Owen Roberts's classic articulation of the legal approach ("the ju-
dicial branch of the government has only one duty; to lay the arti-
cle of the Constitution which is invoked beside the statute which is
challenged and to decide whether the latter squares with the for-
mer"") does not describe what occurred in these cases. Similarly,
the attitudinal approach, which assumes that justices always vote
(on the merits of cases) in accord with their sincere preferences,
cannot (nor does it attempt to) account for the outcomes we have
described.
Positive political theory, in contrast, does provide a reasonable
framework for understanding why justices act in particular ways.
Here, we have highlighted the actions of Justice Brennan, who -
in Frontiero - wrote an opinion endorsing strict scrutiny because
there was a distinct possibility of attracting a fifth vote for that ap-
proach. Even if he failed to obtain a majority, he knew that he
could block Court acceptance of his least preferred position. In
Craig, faced with no possibility of majority support for strict scru-
tiny, Brennan acted in a sophisticated fashion, abandoning his sin-
cerely preferred position and gathering a majority behind an
acceptable alternative.
Just as positive political theory sheds light on this fascinating
episode of constitutional law, it also reminds social scientists of
things that law professors have never forgotten: judges and justices
care about the substance of the law, they are concerned with ap-
propriate standards, and they believe that words carry important
145 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
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meaning. As a consequence, many of the most important battles
inside the Court are not over which litigant prevails, but over how
the case is decided. The sex discrimination cases we have discussed
dramatically illustrate this point. There were clear majorities in
favor of the claimants; yet members of those majority coalitions dis-
agreed vehemently over the appropriate legal standard to employ.
The legal and attitudinal approach, for different reasons, are un-
able to capture these crucial aspects of the process by which jus-
tices reach collegial decisions. Positive political theory, however,
directs our attention toward these stages and, in so doing, carries
enormous potential for helping us unravel the complexities ofjudi-
cial decision making.

